CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 250

7. BRUNEI: FUTURE POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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The Committee considered a memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary (OPD(67) 62) about future policy in Brunei.

THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY recalled that in November, 1966, the

Committee had agreed that our major objective should be to secure the end

of the 1959 Agreement with Brunei, to terminate our obligations to Brunei

and to make an orderly withdrawal leaving behind us a stable state. Our

aim should now be to release ourselves from these responsibilities at the

latest by the time that we withdrew from our bases in Malaysia and Singapore.

The original intention had been to achieve this by formally advising the

Sultan to take the constitutional steps we regarded as necessary and by then

terminating the Agreement if he refused to act accordingly. The Law

Officers had however since advised that two years' notice of withdrawal from the anniversary of the signing of the Agreement (29th September) was

the least that could reasonably be given and that a preferable alternative

course would be to provide help for the Sultan to improve his defence

forces as much as possible and to make progress towards democratic government, with a view to reaching a stage of constitutional advance in

Brunei in which we would be justified in calling for the revision of the

Agreement, or giving a year's notice of termination if such revision were

not agreed.

He had held discussions with the Sultan during the latter part of June

and in early July and had confirmed that the British garrison would be

withdrawn in the autumn of 1968 and that it was our view that the Sultan

should accept responsibility for internal security from that date. The

Sultan had intimated that he would hold us to the letter of the Agreement,

but that it had been made plain in reply that he must not assume that we

would necessarily respond to any request to cope with internal trouble in Brunei. The Sultan had been equally reluctant to give any undertaking about constitutional advance but had been told that we were expecting him

to take certain steps in the course of the next year or so and specifically

to extend the present rudimentary ministerial system and to convene a

constitutional conference not later than the end of 1968. He had also

emphasised to the Sultan the general framework of our forthcoming

reductions of forces in the Far East and the consequent decline in our

ability and will to assist him in the future.. He had recorded the main

points he had made to the Sultan in a formal letter, a copy of which was annexed to his memorandum. This made it clear that the responsibility

for any failure to make progress on the constitutional front would rest

with the Sultan. For the time being our position must rest on the

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